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CLS and a Liberal Critic
Cornel Westt
The battle now raging in the legal academy between the Critical Legal
Studies movement (CLS) and its critics has taken a decisive turn. Battles
over decisions not to hire or give tenure to scholars associated with CLS
have been front-page news in the academic community, and the tone of
scholarly discussion has become decidedly negative. Much of the criticism
has been aimed at one person often considered a guru to CLS, Roberto
Unger. His work has inspired sharply negative commentary both here and
abroad, and his most recent work, Politics, has received several scathing
reviews.
William Ewald's evaluation of Unger's philosophy' is the latest salvo in
the offensive against Unger and, through him, against CLS. Ewald
throws down the gauntlet in the name of logical rigor and analytical pre-
cision, historical accuracy and argumentative soundness, looking closely at
"'the sheer breadth of Unger's knowledge and the unrelenting force of his
analysis.' Neither," Ewald concludes, "is as great as his followers be-
lieve."' Consequently, Ewald argues, both Unger's credibility as a scholar
and the quality of his philosophical contribution to CLS as a whole
should be seriously questioned.
CLS is indeed in need of serious and thorough treatment by left, lib-
eral, and conservative legal scholars. The sooner, the better; the more, the
merrier. In the recent wave of commentary, unfortunately, hostile gut re-
actions have replaced guarded respectful responses; passionate political
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and cultural evaluations have supplanted balanced intellectual assess-
ments. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Ewald's essay.
The overall impression the essay leaves is not one of fruitful critique
but rather one of a mean-spirited academic putdown. This is apparent
from Ewald's strategy, which is to devote more than half of his long arti-
cle to a few pages of Knowledge and Politics. Ewald apparently believes
that Unger's work can be dismissed because a close reading of Unger's
first book, published almost thirteen years ago, discloses an objectionable
interpretation here and a contestable reading there. He then proceeds to
view Unger's later books through the narrow and often blinding lens of
this first youthful effort.
This fundamental mistake regulates Ewald's overall strategy: He re-
fuses to acknowledge the "epistemological break" between Unger's first
book (Knowledge and Politics) and his later work (The Critical Legal
Studies Movement and Politics). By "epistemological break" (Gaston
Bachelard's term popularized by Louis Althusser's interpretation of
Marx), I mean Unger's crucial historicist turn in his work from a self-
styled neo-Aristotelian perspective (or a teleological and essentialist view)
to a full-blown anti-foundational orientation. This basic shift has three
major consequences in Unger's work. First, he gives up the unpersuasive
talk about "intelligible essences" and moves toward immanent critiques of
the rhetoric and practice of democracy and freedom in contemporary soci-
eties. Second, he abandons "total criticism" and links his immanent criti-
ques to concrete historical investigations and specific programmatic for-
mulations. Third, he rejects his ahistorical "trashing" of liberalism and
puts forward his new project in the name of super-liberalism.3
Ewald's efforts are faulty in that they assume that there is a smooth
linear progression from the early to the later Unger. This unwarranted
assumption leads him to conclude that Knowledge and Politics is the core
of Unger's corpus and that the later works are mere embellishments and
elaborations of the early book. Ewald is blind to the shift in Unger's work
and adduces no textual evidence that this shift does not occur. Therefore
his detailed criticisms of Unger's early work are interesting-a few even
convincing-yet the grand claims he makes about what these criticisms
imply regarding Unger's overall philosophy and project are bloated. The
edifice Ewald believes he has dismantled is not a palatial mansion in
which CLS dwells but rather an old decrepit doghouse abandoned by Un-
ger long ago. If Ewald's criticisms are to have the broad implications he
wants to draw, he must engage in a detailed reading of Unger's later
philosophy with the same tenacity with which he examines Unger's early
philosophy and then show that Unger's own self-criticisms of his earlier
work do not prefigure the more significant points made by his critics. Un-
3. See R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 338-40 (rev. ed. 1984).
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til Ewald puts forward such an account he commits the fallacy he accuses
Unger of: The fallacy of agglomeration, of treating clashing and contra-
dictory bodies of thought (i.e., early and later Unger) as if they were a
single body of coherent and consistent thought.
Ewald's essay not only fans and fuels an immobilizing ideological po-
larization, but also hides the basic issues at stake between CLS and main-
stream legal scholarship. Ewald's dismissive approach-that vents its un-
deniable venom behind a "disinterested" critique of microanalytic units of
Unger's texts-forces us to raise fundamental questions regarding the
complex relations between scholarship, ideology, and philosophy in the
legal academy. Within the limited confines of this Comment, I shall ad-
dress some of these issues.
There is a special irony in Ewald's efforts to "trash" Unger in that
they violate the very standards of academic objectivity and scholarly care
he lauds. Ronald Dworkin-for whom Ewald has the distinction of hav-
ing written many of the non-textual footnotes to Law's Empire4-has ar-
gued that CLS theorists are not entitled to claim that liberal legal texts
and doctrines embody "fundamental contradictions" 5 unless they can
justly
claim to have looked for a less skeptical interpretation and failed.
Nothing is easier or more pointless than demonstrating that a flawed
and contradictory account fits as well as a smoother and more attrac-
tive one. The internal skeptic must show that the flawed and contra-
dictory account is the only one available.'
Dworkin's persuasive point here is simply that we must try to present
the most subtle and sympathetic interpretations of an opponent's view-
points before we uncharitably "trash" them. And we must ask: Has
Ewald followed his mentor's sound advice and shown that his reading of
Unger as a flawed, vague, and contradictory philosopher is the only one
available? I suspect not, and I wager that most readers of Ewald's article
will agree. If so, then the razor-sharp blade Dworkin uses on uncharitable
readers is double-edged-cutting both "trashers" within CLS or a trasher
of the trashers like Ewald. Vigorous criticism rises above the level of
trashing when it locates and appreciates both insights and blindnesses,
tensions, and inconsistencies within the views of a worthy opponent.
Dworkin's remarks simply restate the sensible morality of public discus-
sion articulated in chapter II of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty and affirm
the Nietzschean endeavor of proving that one's opponent "did you some
4. See R. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE ix (1986).
5. The "fundamental contradiction" thesis to which Dworkin refers is found in Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979).
6. R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 274.
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good." Like the trashing wing of CLS, Ewald fails to meet these intellec-
tual standards.
These introductory metacritical remarks suggest two types of response
to Ewald. One is a microanalytical approach that examines a few specific
criticisms he makes of Unger, assessing the accuracy of his critiques,
agreeing if warranted or offering competing readings if not. These indeed
are important exercises-already enacted in the early versions and rewrit-
ings of his essay in light of early drafts of this Comment." Yet, given the
limited space, I find it more important to show that a more useful reading
of Unger is available-a reading that is both critical and sympathetic. I
shall attempt to lay bare the nature of the larger CLS project, discern the
specific role and function of Unger's still-developing work in this larger
project, understand why Unger's texts are so seductive to some law stu-
dents and professors, and then put forward some objections to these texts
in light of my own agreements and disagreements with various aspects of
the OLS project.'
CLS bears the marks of its birth in elite law schools, and its members
are exorbitantly preoccupied with the liberalism of the legal academy, that
is, the liberalism of their teachers in elite law schools. They thus see as
especially important those works, such as Unger's, that combat the theory
of their teachers on the theoretical turf their teachers had for so long
claimed as their own. Thus, the extravagant praise of Unger by some
CLS members cited by Ewald is a truthful reflection of the movement's
reaction to those works. It is, however, only a partial truth. People at-
tracted to CLS are also motivated by concern for specific sorts of injus-
tices, and they recognize that theoretical works such as Unger's can pro-
vide at best indirect and obscure guidance in their search for answers to
these more specific problems. What is important in CLS is the nature of
the relationship between theory and practice-theorists do not tell those
with more practical interests what to do, but rather their theory amplifies
the lessons of practice, pointing to ways that deviations from the norms of
behavior and institutional organization can be viewed as norms that can
serve as bases for new forms of social organization. This is what Unger
sees as the focus of his notion of "deviationist doctrine," an idea Ewald
sees as primarily an odd form of unprofessional behavior. This view of the
relationship between theory and practice implies that the demise of theory
will not undermine practice in the way it might seem to in a more tradi-
tional academic movement: Theory is a form of practice in CLS, and,
7. F. NIETZSCHE, On the Adder's Bite, in THUs SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, in THE PORTABLE
NIETZSCHE 180 (W. Kaufmann ed. 1954).
8. See, e.g., Ewald, supra note 2, at 723-24 (extended remarks on the "'leftism'" of Unger's
theory).
9. For an example of this approach regarding Unger's Politics, see West, Between Dewey &
Gramsci 81 Nw. U.L REV. 941 (1987); West, Reassessing CLS, Loy. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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while other forms of practice can learn from it, they are not dependent
upon it. Members of CLS are clearly aware of this. For example, James
Boyle, whose praise of Unger Ewald refers to several times in the essay,
has also explained the limited role Unger's theoretical work plays in the
broader project of CLS:
Unger's Knowledge and Politics gives us a total critique of liber-
alism that tells us nothing about sexual harassment in the workplace,
racial discrimination in the classroom, or the multiple oppressions of
a welfare office. . . .It takes apart the formalized structure behind
liberal political discourse, and liberal political discourse is
narrow ...
So Unger's total critique is best read as a local critique because it
is '(and must be) implicated in the artificial categories it helps to
explode. Of course, there are teachers, editorial writers, politicians,
people involved in ethical arguments, who produce the mode of dis-
course that Unger deconstructs. But the claim to "totality" can be
misunderstood because of the strong prejudice that emanates from
within liberal thought-the prejudice that the deepest and most im-
portant level of what is going on is the theory of the state with its
attendant moral, psychological, and legal postulates. The point is
that such a structural prejudice, and the diminished visibility that it
implies for all the other little exercises of power going on in the
world, is part of the problem and not the solution.10
It is of course possible that Ewald could reconcile the ideas in this quota-
tion with his implication that criticizing Unger undermines CLS. What is
shocking, however, is that he fails even to point to this passage. As a
result, the praise of Unger he quotes so liberally presents at best a partial
picture. The very sources he quotes deny precisely the link between Un-
ger and CLS he describes them as exemplifying. Is this "up to the mark
both in its historical assertions and in its reasoning?""1
To take another example, consider Ewald's "meritocratic" challenge to
Unger's theory of organic groups. Ewald argues that Unger's theory is
unworkable because it fails to consider seriously the importance of effi-
ciency and meritocratic criteria in the operation of key desirable institu-
tions. Ewald suggests that the staff of a large urban hospital simply could
not operate in an acceptable manner (that is, could not care for the hospi-
tal's patients) based on Unger's "non-meritocratic" viewpoint.1 2 Too
much democracy in the name of "eradicating domination" fails to ac-
knowledge the high level of skill and knowledge requisite for effective
10. Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 685, 775-76 (1985) (emphases in original).
I1. Ewald, supra note 2, at 690.
12. Id. at 720-22.
1988]
The Yale Law Journal
physicians; too much "meritocratic hierarchy" precludes the kind of radi-
cal democratic arrangements Unger's theory promotes.
Ewald's example is ingeniously misleading in three ways. First, a hos-
pital is an institution that renders desirable services to human beings
rather than a production site in which people produce inanimate commod-
ities, as in a large factory. Unger's formulations focus on the latter.13 Both
hospitals and factories indeed constitute present-day workplaces of impor-
tance, yet Unger makes it clear that his remarks pertain more to a goods-
producing context than to a service-rendering one. Nevertheless, his three
institutional principles of organic groups-the community of life, the de-
mocracy of ends, and the division of labor-do apply to all contexts of the
workplace in modern society, so at this point Ewald's example is slightly
uncharitable but warranted.
Second, Ewald's characterization of Unger's "non-meritocratic" hospi-
tal-an example Unger does not use-relies principally upon the first two
institutional principles of organic groups. It is highly revealing that Ewald
quotes liberally from the sections on the community of life,14 the democ-
racy of ends, 5 and the state."6 And when Ewald mentions Unger's under-
standing of the role of the division of labor in organic groups he claims it
to be vacuousY.1 Yet his criticism of Unger relies principally on Unger's
inability to balance democracy and meritocracy, people's control with the
specialization and differentiation of indispensable and desirable labor
tasks. When we actually look at what Unger has to say about the division
of labor in organic groups (hospital or factory), we discover that "[tihough
the principle of the division of labor requires that specialization be tem-
pered, it does not prescribe that it be abolished."1 Hence Unger's imagi-
nary hospital is not "non-meritocratic" but rather a place where the high
level of skill and knowledge of doctors, nurses, and maintenance staff is
best put to use in order to cure patients under maximally communal and
democratic conditions. Unger states explicitly, "the organic group must
start by combining a standard of merit with one of need." 9 On the one
hand, "[t]he mere possession of skills can never in itself justify material
advantages or the exercise of power."20 On the other hand, "a relentless
insistence on deciding collectively all significant matters . . . would un-
dermine the possibility of a division of labor in which the talents of each
could be brought to fruition, for specialization allocates meritorious
13. See R. UNGER, KP, supra note 1, at 264-65.
14. See Ewald, supranote 2, at 721 n.215.
15. Id. at 719 n.208, 721 n.215.
16. Id. at 722 & nn.221-22, 723 & n.223.
17. Id. at 721.
18. R. UNGER, KP, supra note 1, at 275-76.
19. Id. at 272.
20. Id. at 273.
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power."'" Unger then significantly though vaguely suggests that the route
between the Scylla of pure meritocracy and the Charybdis of inefficient
democracy "must be resolved by prudential judgment. 12 ' Hence, Unger
rejects exactly the simplistic viewpoint that Ewald attributes to him. And
Ewald's claim about the emptiness of "prudential judgment" is based on
Unger's incomplete elaboration, not his lack of insight.
Last, Ewald holds that the positive program outlined in the theory of
organic groups is "little more than a blur."23 But Unger makes it clear
that he is no utopian radical democrat. He knows that his organic groups
will not "eradicate domination." He repeatedly reminds us that his ideals
are "incapable of being completely realized in history."24 Therefore, his
aim of creating a universal community "is meant to serve as a regulative
ideal rather than as the description of a future society."25 Thus, again,
Ewald's attempt to link Unger's failure to put forward a detailed descrip-
tion of a social world of organic groups to naive utopian sensibilities is
unconvincing. 26 Rather, Unger's religious realism leads him to reject naive
utopianism; just as his open-endedness leaves him reluctant to predeter-
mine the concrete arrangements of the desirable society.
Also troubling is Ewald's criticism of how Unger uses the word "liber-
alism." (Indeed, to signal his distaste he puts the word in a special type
face, suggesting thereby that Unger's use of the word deviates from usual
practice.) All Ewald's talk about how to define "liberalism" would seem
to be more the subject of lexicographic squabbles than legal scholarship
were it not for the fact that on the meaning of "liberalism" turns the
viability of Ewald's most important criticism of Unger. Ewald's central
claim is that Unger is able to find contradictions in liberalism only be-
cause he defines the term so as to lump together thinkers who disagree
with one another. By "agglomerating" thinkers whose thoughts clash, Un-
ger has, according to Ewald, put the rabbit into his hat, all so he could
feign surprise when the contradictions came jumping out of it.
In fact it may be Ewald who is guilty of smuggling presuppositions into
his definition of the term. He assumes that the term "liberalism" must
refer to something that could be recognized as a coherent, internally con-
sistent body of thought that is defined in terms of the rigorous logical
standards he espouses. For his own purposes in the common rooms at
Oxford, such standards may be appropriate. But Unger is not interested
in debunking the claims of philosophers to have found a "liberalism" that
is not internally contradictory. He is instead interested in the connection
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Ewald, supra note 2, at 722.
24. R. UNGER, KP, supra note 1, at 260.
25. Id.
26. See Ewald, supra note 2, at 722-24.
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between types of knowledge and the exercise of political power-hence the
title of the book, Knowledge and Politics. The "liberalism" he criticizes is
the set of those ideas that have routinely been used as justifications for the
use of power by politicians and their apologists since the seventeenth cen-
tury. These people have confronted different situations, their purposes
have differed from one another's, and the ideas they have used differ ac-
cordingly. Yet the leaders of Western societies have tried over the last 150
years, almost without exception, to describe their policies as "liberal."
The term "liberalism" thus has come to us with no unitary meaning, but
instead with a dynamic and flexible "open-textured" quality27 that devel-
oped from the diverse and contesting influences acting upon it. It is there-
fore perfectly acceptable for Unger to point out that, over the years, the
term has been used to justify the exercise of power in ways that contradict
one another, and that its value as a legitimating force for using power is
now useful only insofar as people do not see that it can be used for both
every situation and its opposite. In doing so, he takes advantage of com-
mon uses of the term liberalism. There is no agglomeration here, at least
not by Unger.
Ewald misses the basic issue dividing CLS and its liberal critics. He
invokes criteria, such as "historical accuracy" and "soundness of argu-
ment," as if they are not being contested on a deeper intellectual and insti-
tutional level. Such an appeal may be heart-warming and image-boosting
to one's peers, but it does not meet the fundamental critique CLS is put-
ting forward against mainstream legal scholarship. CLS neither rejects
appeals to historical accuracy nor abandons sound argumentation. Rather,
it probes the ways in which such criteria have been and are deployed in
order to preclude certain kinds of appeals to historical accuracy to delegi-
timate specific forms of argumentation. The premature-and usually
ideologically-motivated-attempt to view such intellectual probing as irra-
tional is both untrue and unfair. In fact, such a misleading characteriza-
tion of the intellectual work of CLS reflects a refusal of liberal legal
scholars to engage at a deeper level of theoretical exchange. There is no
doubt that legal liberalism can put forward a plausible reply to this CLS
critique, but it must be done on the metaphilosophical and metainstitu-
tional levels-that is, reflections that seriously interrogate and justify the
kind of prevailing standards, the present institutional arrangements of le-
gal scholarship and education, and their link to the liberal legal status
quo. It is quite telling that no liberal legal theorist has yet done this in
response to CLS. Instead we get implicit appeals to the sheer facticity and
entrenched immovability of the present conditions of legal scholarship and
education or, as with Ewald, pronouncement of the supposedly self-
evident standards of the liberal consensus. Yet as the power and potency
27. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-25, 249 (1961).
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of CLS escalates, such sophisticated liberal defenses will come-for
thoughtful proponents of a status quo always emerge when they feel it is
sufficiently threatened.
The first basic issue dividing CLS and mainstream legal scholarship
has to do with the cultural context in which legal scholarship and educa-
tion take place. This is why Ewald's attempt to invoke criteria of histori-
cal accuracy and soundness of argument as if they are context-free, uni-
versal standards untainted by ideological prejudgments and outside of
power-struggles and political conflict is problematic. The commonsensical
reply to such suspicion is that without these standards we are left with a
nihilistic epistemic situation in which "anything goes," or in which
"might determines right," etc.2" Such a reply misses the point. The issue
here is not the non-existence of standards but rather the way in which
prevailing standards are part and parcel of a larger form of life-a cul-
tural context of legal scholarship and education with great authority and
power that invokes its standards, in part, in order to reproduce itself. This
reproduction marginalizes and devalues certain perspectives, orientations,
questions, answers, styles, and persons. If we view this complex process of
reproduction as a thoroughly historical and political affair-from the kind
of standards invoked to the type of members admitted-we are forced to
become more relentlessly critical and self-critical of its results.
Surely the efforts to create the present cultural context of legal scholar-
ship and education constitute a long and arduous battle. Both the liberal
rule of law and civilian government-two grand achievements of most ad-
vanced capitalist societies-result from much bloodshed; bloodshed from
those who fought and fight to create and sustain them as well as blood-
shed from those who have been and are victimized by their flaws, imper-
fections, and structural deficiencies. Given this crucial link between legal
systems and their regulatory impact on the legitimate instrumentalities of
violence, as well as legal systems' crucial role in inhibiting or enhancing
the well-being of the populace, CLS begins with an historical and social
analysis of the present cultural context of legal scholarship and education.
This analysis-aided but not dictated by theorists such as Marx, Weber,
Foucault, Du Bois, De Beauvoir and others-leads CLS to contest its own
context while finding a place within it. The aim of this critique is not
simply to understand better how the cultural context of legal scholarship
and education is reproduced, but also to change this context. This change
is promoted on the intellectual plane by means of a thorough questioning
of the assumptions and presuppositions of the kind of standards invoked,
the role these standards play in encouraging certain viewpoints and dis-
28. For an exemplary response of this sort, see Fiss, The Death of the Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (1986). Fiss's rather flamboyant title is a bit misleading in that he shows how such a "death" is
unlikely given the "thickness" of the legal form of life in American society.
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couraging others, and the way in which these standards legitimate the
deployment of key notions such as impartiality, disinterestedness, objective
due process, and value-free procedure. These key notions of liberal per-
spectives have indeed contributed greatly to minimizing bloodshed and en-
hancing the welfare of the populace. But they also hide and conceal sys-
temic relations of power that continue to encourage bloodshed and inhibit
people's well-being.
A basic purpose of CLS is to disclose the degree to which liberal per-
spectives are unable to be truthful about themselves owing to the blind-
nesses and silences reinforced by their assumptions and presuppositions.
The "standards" of judgment that shape liberal discourse make it difficult
and even illegitimate to discuss certain issues-especially those that con-
test the very "impartiality" and "objectivity" that hide the operations of
power in liberal discourses. Those liberal standards of judgment are espe-
cially delegitimating to those who contest them in an interrogative and
visionary style which differs from the traditional propositional form of
professional journals. Like Foucault, some members of CLS-especially
Unger-try to show the complex ways in which partiality and partisan-
ship are at work in the dispassionate styles and forms of liberal discourse,
including their implicit silences, blindnesses, and exclusions. 9 These
blindnesses and silences are not simply logical contradictions and analyti-
cal paradoxes. Rather, they are unintentional turns away from or inten-
tional justifications of operations of power that scar human bodies, delimit
life-chances for many, and sustain privilege for some. This point is made
forcefully in a contemporary classic essay by Robert Cover.30 Within the
cultural context of legal scholarship and education-a context parasitic on
contexts in the large society, such as multinational corporations, and pro-
foundly conditioning for other contexts-serious reflections on these oper-
ations of power have been taboo."' Like the recent work of Jacques Der-
rida in literary studies, Richard Rorty and Paul Feyerabend in
philosophy, Catharine Mackinnon and Mary Daly in Women's Studies,
Edward Said in Middle Eastern Studies, Noam Chomsky on United
States foreign policy, and Maulana Karenga in Black Studies, the intent
of CLS to contest its context requires that scholars make the very opera-
tions of power in their own academic milieu an object of investigation-in
the name of intellectual integrity, critical intelligence, and moral responsi-
bility. This means creating and sustaining new subcultures of critical dis-
course within the very contexts one is contesting. This practical strategy is
not a crude Leninist tactic of boring-from-within, because CLS has no
29. Regarding Foucault's analysis, see, e.g., Smart, The Politics of Truth and The Problem of
Harmony, in FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL READER, 157-73 (D. Hoy ed. 1986); Bove, Introduction to
The Foucault Phenomenon: The Problematics of Style, in G. DELEUZE, FOUCAULT, vii-xI (1988).
30. See Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
31. See Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 259 (1987).
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group, party, or organization outside of its own milieu. Rather, CLS feeds
on the very constituency it both is and wants to convince.
The second basic issue between CLS and its liberal critics has to do
with the role of historical consciousness and theoretical reflection in legal
scholarship. CLS does not simply view law as politics but rather tries to
show how and why dominant legal practices support a particular kind of
politics-namely, a liberal politics unmindful of its contradictions and de-
ficiencies and unwilling to question thoroughly its theoretical limitations
and social shortcomings. By means as diverse as the controversial "funda-
mental contradiction" thesis of Duncan Kennedy and the provocative his-
toricist claims of Roberto Unger, CLS thinkers have forced legal scholars
to grapple with the complex links between law and structural constraints
imposed on it by contingent dynamics in the state, economy, and cul-
ture-links often concealed by liberal versions of legal formalism, legal
positivism, and even much of legal realism. This salutary stress on the
worldliness of legal operations has rudely awakened many law students
and professors from their procedural slumber and persuaded them to read
pertinent texts in historiography, social theory, and cultural criticism. 2
Such an awakening may indeed lend itself to a shallow dilettantism-yet
it also undeniably broadens and enriches rather insular legal discourses in
exciting and relevant ways, for it links legal studies to instructive and
insightful discourses in the humanities and social scientific disciplines too
often ignored by legal scholars.
Historical consciousness in Anglo-American legal thought for too long
has been associated with the legal realists' limited appeal to experience
and with the narrow institutional concerns of the law and economics
school. CLS helps us perceive legal systems as complicated structures of
power which both shape and are shaped by weighty historical legacies of
class exploitation, racial subjugation, and gender subordination. The type
of historical consciousness promoted by CLS is inseparable from theoreti-
cal reflection because attention to structures of power over time and space
requires description and explanation of the dynamics of these structures.
Such a requirement pushes one into the frightening wilderness of social,
political, and cultural theory. Unfortunately, "theory" has often been sim-
plistically invoked as a mere weapon with which to beat legal formalists
and positivists over the head. A more subtle grasp of the role of theory
discloses the degree to which ideological frameworks circumscribe the op-
tions of legal scholars and the way in which intellectual consensus on pre-
vailing paradigms prohibits reflection about the function of authority and
power in legal discourses. In this way, CLS has justified the centrality of
32. CLS is principally responsible for the recent refreshing appearances of Christopher Hill, E.P.
Thompson, Eugene Genovese, Sheila Rowbatham, and other social historians in the pages of major
law journals.
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Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Lukacs, Foucault, and other social
theorists in contemporary legal scholarship.
Ewald's essay does not touch on any of these contributions of CLS to
legal studies. Instead he views CLS as some foreign intrusion into the civil
conversation of properly trained liberal legal thinkers. His approach im-
plies that CLS is but a morbid symptom-perpetrated by ex-New Left-
ists-of muddleheadedness to be exorcised by means of logic, scholarship,
and good sense. In light of recent tenure denials and battles over CLS
scholars at such liberal bastions as the Harvard Law School and the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School, we must ask whether Ewald's rhetor-
ical strategy is to legitimate the use of power in law school faculties
against the placement and retention of CLS professors and to promote the
authority of legal liberalism in contemporary ideological debates.
My general complaint about Ewald's readings is that he makes Unger
appear less intelligent, learned, and sensible than Unger actually is. And,
by implication, Ewald suggests that those attracted to Unger's work have
been duped. Yet Ewald gives us no account of why so many law students
and professors have been misled. Surely, it is not simply because they have
rejected Ewald's criteria of historical accuracy and sound argumentation.
There are two main reasons for which some of the brightest law students
and young law professors pay attention to CLS in general and to Unger
in particular. First, there is a widespread disenchantment with the curric-
ulum in elite law schools. The older legal pedagogical methods are viewed
by many as boring, tedious, and irrelevant. Law classes are viewed as
tangentially interesting academic hoops through which one must jump in
order to pursue a careerist and private quest for money, position, and
status in the conservative world of corporate law practice. Many law stu-
dents and professors who fuse broad intellectual curiosity with progressive
political commitment not only find this quest problematic, but also find
CLS attractive.
Second, CLS serves as a kind of shortcut to the classics of left social
theory, cultural criticism, and philosophy. By this I mean that CLS often
serves as a kind of overnight education in those oppositional intellectual
traditions-Marxism, feminism, black radicalism-which are marginal or
absent in law schools. Indeed, much of both the intellectual creativity and
theoretical mediocrity of CLS thinkers is due, in large part, to the self-
taught character of these thinkers. This character is accentuated by the
process by which law students become law professors-a process that pro-
vides little time for serious and sustained reflection and research prior to
appointment. Therefore, few CLS figures are thoroughly grounded in the
very traditions of left thought they propound. Instead, they are forced to
play catch-up while they simultaneously wean themselves from and furi-
ously attack the liberal tradition in which they have been taught.
The role of Unger's texts are instructive in this regard. They are seduc-
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tive to many CLS people precisely because they combine painstaking re-
search, passionate commitment, aversion to classic liberalism, prophetic vi-
sion, and exposition of left intellectual traditions. Unger's work provides
instruction and inspiration to young prospective CLS people. And for the
less disciplined ones, his texts serve as a substitute for homework. In this
way, Unger's work-though some of the most significant and provocative
thought on the left today-is overrated by some CLS people. This is un-
derstandable given the grand contribution Unger's texts make to the intel-
lectual formation of people who are bursting out of the insular and paro-
chial constraints of legal education. Furthermore, Unger's literary style
stands in stark contrast to the bureaucratic prose of much of legal scholar-
ship. As a social theorist, intellectual historian, political activist, and pro-
phetic visionary, Unger speaks to the head and heart of his CLS sympa-
thizers. There is no doubt that he is a towering figure in CLS-though he
is not the paradigmatic or exemplary one.
Despite his unique style and distinctive perspectives (especially his reli-
gious sensibilities), the work of the early Unger (now corrected in his later
work) shares some of the intellectual limitations and political shortcom-
ings of his fellow CLS thinkers. The major issue here evolves around
CLS' thoroughly negative attitude toward liberalism. This attitude has an
intramural character that tends to ignore the historically ambiguous leg-
acy of liberalism and thereby to downplay some of its grand achievements.
To minimize the importance of these achievements-a strong motif in
CLS work-is to be historically amnesiac and politically naive. Such a
view overlooks liberalism as an ideology which informs and inspires cru-
cial aspects of oppositional left movements. Instead, CLS sees almost ex-
clusively the crucial ways in which liberalism serves as a brake on such
movements. This seamy side of liberalism is hidden by the liberal scholars
who are hegemonic in legal education-as CLS thinkers rightly empha-
size. Yet outside elite law schools and inside concrete movements for social
change in the larger society, the ambiguous role of liberalism looms large.
There simply is no intellectually acceptable, morally preferable, and
practically realizable left social vision and program that does not take lib-
eralism as a starting point in order to rethink, revise, and reform it in a
creative manner. The kind of basic problems to which liberalism is a re-
sponse must be reconceptualized and retheorized in light of both the grand
achievements and structural deficiencies of liberalism. Since I view the
latter as (to put it crudely) the inability of liberal capitalist practices to
take seriously the ideals of individual liberty, citizen participation, and
democratic checks and balances over forms of collective power that affect
the populace, liberalism is not so much a culprit (as CLS thinkers argue)
but rather an incomplete historical project impeded by powerful economic
interests (especially corporate interests), and culturally circumscribed in-
stitutional structures like racism, patriarchy, and homophobia. I find it
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ironic that as a black American, a descendant of those who were victim-
ized by American liberalism, I must call attention to liberalism's accom-
plishments. Yet I must do so-not because liberal thinkers have some mo-
nopoly on rigor and precision-but rather because these historic
accomplishments were achieved principally by the blood, sweat, and tears
of subaltern peoples. Liberalism is not the possession of white male elites
in high places, but rather a dynamic and malleable tradition the best of
which has been made vital and potent by struggling victims of class ex-
ploitation, racist subjugation, and patriarchal subordination. In this re-
gard, liberalism signifies neither a status quo to defend (as with Ewald)
nor an ideology to trash (as with some of CLS), but rather a diverse and
complex tradition that can be mined in order to enlarge the scope of
human freedom. In other words, the United States Constitution lends it-
self to a perennial struggle for legitimation-with contested interpreta-
tions the primary motor in this struggle.
My kind of left oppositional thought and practice builds on and goes
beyond liberalism as a kind of Aufhebung of liberalism. And, I believe,
deep down in the CLS project there is the notion that the most desirable
society will look liberal in some crucial ways. Yet the intramural charac-
ter of CLS forces it to be excessively rebellious against the truncated liber-
alism of its fathers in order to sustain much of its lan vital. Intellectual
integrity and political urgency force me to sidestep such childish games.
This is why, though I find CLS intellectually exciting and politically in-
spiring, I prefer the democratic socialism of John Dewey and R.H. Taw-
ney, the cultural criticism of C. Wright Mills and Thorsten Veblen, the
political economy of Paul Sweezy and Alec Nove, and the anti-racist, anti-
sexist, and anti-homophobic perspectives of W.E.B. Du Bois, Sheila
Rowbatham, and Audre Lorde over that of most of CLS.
The thoroughgoing negativism of much OLS scholarship leaves the le-
gal left with little to do other than occupy slots and challenge the curricu-
lum in the legal academy; that is, it tends to limit its political praxis to
pedagogical reform in elite law schools. This indeed is a noble endeavor,
but it channels intellectual and political energy away from constructive
proposals and programs for the larger society and culture. More point-
edly, it relieves OLS of the burden of specifying and consolidating link-
ages with other oppositional forces in the United States and abroad. Be-
cause it lacks this kind of self-reflection on how to contribute to the
building of a broad progressive movement at this particular historical mo-
ment-beyond that of legal pedagogical reform-CLS remains an isolated
and insulated oppositional affair within the ivy halls of elite law schools
that displays the major features of a Freudian family romance. Ewald's
essay is a less than powerful response in defense of the liberal fathers. I
am sure more serious ones will follow. Yet to remain inscribed within this
intramural affair by mere negativistic trashing of the liberal fathers is to
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remain too enamored of their power, influence, status, and authority. To
ignore the liberal fathers is indeed foolhardy-but the aim is to link rebel-
lion in the legal household to social change in the larger polis. It is time
for CLS to both grow up and grow out by historically situating the contri-
butions and shortcomings of its liberal fathers in relation to their project
and by politically situating their own breakthroughs and blindnesses in
relation to the progressive struggles in this country and in the rest of the
world.

